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rights law requires a legal framework to safeguard the rights to liberty and personal integrity by preventing
arbitrary detention. However, research suggests that extra-legal factors may inﬂuence decisions to detain. This
article presents observational and interview data to describe how decisions to detain are made in practice in
one jurisdiction (England andWales)where a tension between policy and practice has been described. The anal-
ysis shows that practitionersmould the law into ‘practical criteria’ that appear to form a set of operational criteria
for identifying cases to which the principle of soft paternalism may be applied. Most practitioners also appear
willing, albeit often reluctantly, to depart from their usual reliance on the principle of soft paternalism and
authorise detention of people with the capacity to refuse treatment, in order to prevent serious harm. We
propose a potential resolution for the tension between policy and practice: two separate legal frameworks to
authorise detention, one with a suitable test of capacity, used to enact soft paternalism, and the other to provide
legal justiﬁcation for detention for psychiatric treatment of the small number of people who retain decision-
making capacity but nonetheless choose to place others at risk by refusing treatment. This separation of detention
powers into two systems, according to the principle that justiﬁes the use of detention would be intellectually
coherent, consistent with human rights instruments and, being consistent with the apparent moral sentiments
of practitioners, less prone to idiosyncratic interpretations in practice.
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The use of compulsory hospital admission for psychiatric assessment
and/or treatment is a relatively common practice in many countries
(Riecher-Rossler & Rossler, 2007). However, there remains little con-
sensus regarding the circumstances underwhich it is morally justiﬁable
to use such compulsion, since it deprives the person of their liberty and
the legal criteria authorising compulsory admission vary considerably
between different jurisdictions (Appelbaum, 1997; Fistein, Holland,
Clare, & Gunn, 2009).
International human rights law requires a legal framework to
safeguard the rights to liberty and personal integrity of people affected
by mental ill-health by preventing arbitrary detention (United
Nations, 1991; World Health Organization, 2003). Nonetheless, legal
scholars have repeatedly questioned the effectiveness of mental healthGroup, The Primary Care Unit,
l of Clinical Medicine, Box 113,
Fax: +44 1223 76515.
).
. This is an open access article underlegislation as a means of protecting the human rights of people receiv-
ing psychiatric treatment (Appelbaum, 1997; Gostin, 2008). Empirical
research also raises questions regarding the effectiveness of much of
this legislation as a safeguard for human rights; for example, rates of
detention are not necessarily lower in jurisdictions with stringent
legal criteria constraining the use of compulsory admission, nor do
they necessarily decrease when a jurisdiction enacts new law with
stricter criteria (Zinkler & Priebe, 2002; Salize & Dressing, 2004).
The reasons for this gap between ‘policy’ and ‘practice’ are not fully
understood. A body of research based upon clinicians' accounts of
their decision-making processes suggests that a complex constellation
of factors may inﬂuence the decision to detain (Bagby, Thompson,
Dickens, & Nohara, 1991; Engleman, Jobes, Berman, & Langbein, 1992;
Kullgren, Jacobsson, Lynoe, Kohn, & Levav, 1996; Hoge et al., 1997;
Sattar, Pinals, Din, & Appelbaum, 2006). The role of individual differences
in theway risk is assessed by clinicians (Bartlett, 2010) and the role of ‘gut
instinct’ baseduponprofessional experience (Glover-Thomas, 2011) have
also been highlighted as factors affecting day-to-day mental health deci-
sion making. Psychiatrists' accounts of the way in which they learn to
make these decisions, through observation of the practice of colleagues,the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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has been cited as an explanation of the discrepancy between policy
and practice (Wand & Wand, 2013). However, there is limited recent
observational research describing the processes by which actual
decisions to admit are made (Holstein, 1988; Quirk, Lelliot, Audini, &
Buston, 2000).
The aim of this study was to describe the ways in which decisions to
detain are made in one jurisdiction (England and Wales) where a
tension between policy and practice has been described. We sought to
understand the reasons behind day-to-day mental health decision
making, to describe the principles on which actual decisions were
based, and to analyse how and why they might differ from the legal
framework that deﬁnes the circumstances under which lawful deten-
tion may take place.
In England andWales, the circumstances underwhich someonemay
lawfully be detained in hospital for psychiatric assessment or treatment
are deﬁned in theMental Health Act 1983 as amended 2007 (MHA).Most
compulsory psychiatric admissions are authorised on the grounds given
in Section 2 or 3 of the MHA. Two medical practitioners (one of whom
has particular expertise in the diagnosis or management of mental
disorders) and a specially trained Approved Mental Health Professional
(AMHP), who must have a non-medical professional qualiﬁcation
(often, but not necessarily, social work), must agree that the legal
criteria for compulsory admission apply.
Section 2 authorises detention in hospital for a period of up to
28 days, for the purpose of assessment. The criteria are that the patient
• is suffering frommental disorder of a nature or degree whichwarrants the
detention of the patient in a hospital for assessment (or for assessment
followed by medical treatment) for at least a limited period; and
• he ought to be so detained in the interests of his own health or safety or
with a view to the protection of other persons.
Section 3 authorises detention in hospital for a period of up to six
months and can be renewed. The criteria are that the patient
• is suffering from mental disorder of a nature or degree which makes it
appropriate for him to receive medical treatment in a hospital; and
• it is necessary for the health or safety of the patient or for the protection of
other persons that he should receive such treatment and it cannot be
provided unless he is detained under this section; and
• appropriate medical treatment is available for him.
The 2007 MHA amendments came into practice in November 2008
and effectively relaxed the criteria for compulsory admission (Glover-
Thomas, 2011). These changes were the result of a decade-long debate
and were opposed by key stakeholder groups who expressed concerns
that the amended Act weakened safeguards for the rights to liberty
and self-determination of people at risk of detention (Mental Health
Alliance, 2007). In contrast to themental health legislation ofmany eco-
nomically developed countries, there is no requirement to establish that
the patient poses a risk to the safety of themselves or others, or that they
lack the capacity to make a decision to consent to treatment.
Two years before the amendment of the MHA, the parliament had
enacted another new piece of legislation, theMental Capacity Act 2005
(MCA), which sets out criteria for the provision of care and treatment
(for physical or mental ill-health) deemed necessary in the best inter-
ests of people who are unable to give consent, as a result of impairment
or dysfunction of mind or brain. In April 2009, additional safeguards
concerning in-patient treatment and residential care for people who
lack the capacity to give or withhold consent, the MCA Deprivation of
Liberty Safeguards (MCA-DoLS) came into force to ensure compliance
with Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as
interpreted through a body of case law (Winterwerp v the Netherlands
[1979] ECHR, Litwa v Poland [2000] ECHR, HL v UK [2005] ECHR).
The deprivation of liberty is said to occur in circumstances where a
person is under continuous control and supervision, is not free toleave, and lacks capacity to consent to these arrangements (P v Cheshire
West and Chester Council and another and P and Q v Surrey County Council
[2014] WLR 2). A deprivation of liberty is lawful only if it represents
• a proportionate response to the likelihood of [the patient] suffering harm
and the seriousness of that harm
and if the person authorizing that restriction
• reasonably believes that it is necessary… in order to prevent harm to [the
patient]
Detention under a MCA DoLS authorisation may be considered less
stigmatising, as unlike the MHA there is no connotation with detention
for public protection. However, access to independent review and
appeal against MCA DoLS authorisation is less straightforward. If a
patient objects to the hospitalization or to any of the treatment they
will receive there, a MCA DoLS authorisation cannot be granted and
detention under the MHA is the only available option.
Consequently, it appeared that the people who decide whether or
not to use compulsory admission for psychiatric treatment would be
making those decisions within a relatively complex regulatory frame-
work with two key pieces of legislation, one of which potentially con-
ﬂicted with their professions' values or their personal moral intuitions
(Roberts, Peay, & Eastman, 2002). Furthermore, the interface between
the two frameworks is complex and poorly understood (Clare et al.,
2013; House of Lords Select Committee on the Mental Capacity Act
2005, 2014). It remains unclear what the implications of this state of
affairs might be for clinical practice.
Understanding the ways in which the new legislation was imple-
mented in practice could potentially highlight the need for speciﬁc
training or for further law reform. Furthermore, a detailed description
of the principles upon which decisions to detain are based in practice,
and thewaydecisionmakers justify any departure from the legal frame-
work, has broader implications for understanding and addressing the
gap between policy and practice that has been observed in multiple
studies involving a large number of jurisdictions (Appelbaum, 1997;
Zinkler & Priebe, 2002).
2. Methods
Over a 12-month period, we collected data on the ways in which
decisions to detain people under Section 2 or Section 3 of the MHA
were made by medical practitioners and AMHPs working in the
catchment area of a mental healthcare provider in the East of England.
The study comprised two components:
1) Direct observation of medical practitioners and AMHPs discussing
whether adults they had assessed met criteria for compulsory
admission and should be detained. These discussions were audio-
recorded. In order to assist interpretation, the lead author (EF) also
conducted and recorded brief (15–20 min) semi-structured inter-
views with the medical practitioners and AMHPs immediately after
they had made their decisions, asking about the decision-making
process.
2) In order to gain a broader understanding of practice than could be
obtained through observation of a sample of MHA assessments
alone, detailed interviews with medical practitioners and AMHPs,
each lasting up to two hours, were also conducted. Following the
data collection methods used in Biographic-Narrative Interpretive
Methodology (Wengraf, 2001), participants were ﬁrst asked to tell
the story of their involvement with compulsory treatment over the
course of their working lives. They were then asked to describe in
more detail up to seven particular incidents of decisions to detain
that they hadmentioned in their stories. This approachwas adopted
in order to discover the factors that participants consider important
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inappropriately narrow, reductionist focus. All interviews were
audio-recorded.
Initial sampling was directed towards collecting data from assess-
ments and practitioners that reﬂected the diversity of situations under
which MHA assessments take place, aiming for maximum variability.
As the project progressed, an iterative approach was adopted. Data
were analysed as theywere collected, building understanding and seek-
ing out conﬁrming and disconﬁrming cases.
A thematic analysis of the data was carried out by EF. All the audio-
recordings were transcribed verbatim, followed by initial line-by-line
coding. Patterns and relationships between the codes were studied in
order to identify themes that arose when participants were making or
discussing their decisions about admission to hospital for compulsory
assessment or treatment (Braun & Clarke, 2006). This initial analysis
was used as the basis for an institutional ethnography (Redley &
Weinberg, 2007). Key themes judged particularly relevant to the re-
search question were re-analysed by EF and described in greater detail,
paying attention to the ways in which the participants constructed and
characterised the importance of concepts such as ‘mental disorder’ or
‘risk’. In order to understand the principles on which participants
based their decisions to detain, attention was paid to evidence of
responsiveness to proximal interactive cues, evident in the discussions
between medical practitioners and AMHPs and to distal institutional
mandates, inferred from the researchers' knowledge of the legal frame-
works and local policy. To improve the credibility of the conclusions, the
analysis was reviewed by IC and AH, who attempted to identify and ex-
plore alternative ways of understanding the data.
3. Results
During the observational component, seven discussions about the
use of compulsory admission or treatment were recorded. These in-
volved fourteen different practitioners: ﬁve AMHPs, ﬁve psychiatrists,
and four primary care physicians (general practitioners or GPs). Three
of the seven discussions concerned assessments that had taken place
in the patient's home, two had taken place on a mental health in-
patient unit, and the remaining two had taken place in the emergency
department of a general hospital and in a police custody suite. This is
representative of the range of settings where MHA assessments occur.
In ﬁve of the seven cases, all three practitioners involved in the discus-
sion reached consensus (in two of those cases, the result was detention
under the MHA and in the other three cases voluntary treatment was
organized, either in hospital or in the community). In the remaining
two cases, the medical practitioners recommended detention under
the MHA, but the AMHP did not agree that this was necessary and the
patient was not detained.
During the interview component, ﬁfteen psychiatrists and one
AMHP provided accounts of a further 112 cases (six or seven from
each participant) in which a decision about the use of detention was
made. Six participants worked in General Psychiatry, ﬁve in Older
People's Mental Health, two worked with people with Intellectual Dis-
ability, one worked in Rehabilitation Psychiatry, one in Liaison Psychia-
try, and one in a Forensic Mental Health Team. Five participants were
women. Seven participants had experience of mental health practice
outside England and Wales. Five participants had more than ten years
of professional experience in making decisions about detaining people
for compulsory assessment or treatment.
Seven of the sixteen interviewees expressed concerns about the ef-
fectiveness of the MHA as a safeguard for the human rights of their pa-
tients: three expressed concerns based primarily on the content of the
Act, and the other four on the way they perceived the Act being
interpreted in practice. One interviewee expressed the view that the
Act provided a relatively good safeguard for human rights. The remain-
ing eight interviewees were neutral.Five key themes emerged from the analysis of the instances and ac-
counts of decision making: (i) diagnosis, (ii) availability of alternatives
to detention, (iii) likelihood of response to treatment, (iv) risk assess-
ment, and (v) the patient's capacity to make decisions about treatment.
An additional theme that emerged was (vi) the degree of difﬁculty
inherent in the decision making. These themes are discussed in more
detail below, accompanied by illustrative excerpts from the data.
3.1. Diagnosis
Diagnosis was raised during all of the discussions recorded in
the course of the observational component of the study. Before
recommending compulsory admission, practitioners explicitly reached
a consensus position on the presence of acute mental illness, such as de-
pression, bipolar affective disorder, or schizophrenia. In practice, this lim-
itation of detention to cases of acute mental illness appeared to be
achieved in two stages: screening and assessment. All seven assessments
observed in this studywere arranged following reports of behaviour that
could be associatedwith a severe depressive episode (self-harm, expres-
sions of suicidal ideation) or behaviour that appeared irrational and
could be associated with a psychotic episode. At the assessment itself,
the purpose of discussing diagnosis appeared to be to establish the
presence of acute mental illness, either positively, by gathering evidence
of pathognomic symptoms or of pre-existing diagnosis by a trusted
authority, or by exclusion of other possibilities:
Psy4: we even wondered if this was personality disorder …
GP3: Mm, I was going to say could it be PD [personality disorder], not
depression. PD with alcohol.
Psy4: Well this is what we got, you know … But the history didn't sup-
port that and {psychotherapist} agreed. You know, the history is admis-
sion, ECT, sections, hypomanic spell, you know. It just doesn't ﬁt with a
personality disorder. But, you know, in between, reasonable function,
but not so much recently.
This observation was supported by the interview data. Practitioners
appeared reluctant to use detention in cases involving long-term condi-
tions judged unlikely to respond to compulsory treatment:
Sectioning people with dementia, on the whole, is a bad thing, because
it's not fair. It's a different deal, getting sectioned if you've got dementia
than if you've got functional illness because if you've got functional ill-
ness it's likely that with some treatment you will recover and go back
to where you were [Psy9].
And so a lot of people with learning disabilities [intellectual disability]
who'd got in trouble with the law were detained … and one really
sometimes struggled to see whether there were genuine beneﬁts that
came out of that [Psy6].
3.2. Availability of alternatives to detention.
Having agreed upon a diagnosis of mental illness, practitioners
discussed whether detention under the MHA was the only appropriate
response. The possibility of intensive home treatment (crisis care) was
raised and considered as an alternative to hospital admission in all
cases where the person being assessed had not already been admitted:
AMHP1: Can she be treated at home? This is what I′d like to know.
Psy2: That is, I think, the big question. There is undoubtedly an element
of risk. Can that risk be sufﬁciently ameliorated in home treatment or
not?What do you think?
Psy1: I′d say no. I think, from the little we know, the picture changes a
bit too much. An’ I′m not quite sure that home treatment will contain
that.
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treated by her colleagues as a call to justify the absence of its use. This
suggests that home treatment is considered to be the default option. A
lack of availability of round-the-clock crisis care in the community
was not raised as a problem by the participants, suggesting that they
perceived this to be a readily available alternative to admission despite
the fact that lack of its availability has been raised as a factor contribut-
ing to the use of detention in some areas (Mind, 2011).
Having established the necessity of in-patient treatment, practi-
tioners discussed the need for compulsory rather than informal admis-
sion. A preference for informal admission was a feature of much of the
talk; detentionwas characterised as undesirable whilst informal admis-
sion was characterised as the ‘least restrictive option’, to be pursued
whenever possible:
Psy3 [addressing GP2]:We'll recommend a Section 2 and the AMHPwill
complete if she doesn't agree to come in when the ambulance arrives.
AMHP2:We are guided by the principle of the least restrictive alternative.
We want to give her some choice but we also need to keep her safe…
Psy3 [addressing AMHP2]: So you said you may decide not to make a
recommendation? Depending on whether she comes downstairs or not?
AMHP2: Yes, I think that just depends on whether or not…
The notion of the ‘least restrictive option’ used by practitioners relates
to the legal ‘Principle of Less Restriction’, characterised by the
requirement within the MHA Code of Practice in effect at the time the
research was conducted (2008: p5, paragraph 1.3) that ‘People taking ac-
tion without a patient's consent must attempt to keep to a minimum the re-
strictions they impose on the patient's liberty, having regard to the purpose
for which the restrictions are imposed.’ Subsequently, the Code of Practice
has been revised and states (Department of Health, 2015) that:
‘Where it is possible to treat a patient safely and lawfully without
detaining them under the Act, the patient should not be detained’ and
‘If the Act is used, detention should be used for the shortest time neces-
sary in the least restrictive hospital setting available.’
Participants acknowledged that the cases where the patient had
been told that she had no choice but to accept hospitalization, could
be viewed as wrongful de facto detention that sidesteps the procedural
safeguards of the MHA: it ‘bent the rules somewhat in that it was border-
line coercion’ (Psy3) and was ‘a thinly veiled threat’ (GP3). In the narra-
tive interviews, ﬁve participants described cases where they had
difﬁculty distinguishing the boundary between providing patients
with clear information about their options, and introducing an element
of coercion that prevented voluntary consent to informal admission. In
such cases, the notion of a Principle of Least Restriction was frequently
raised as a justiﬁcation for the decision to attempt to proceedwith treat-
ment on an informal basis:
Psy 1: Fortunately, he was persuaded to come into hospital voluntarily,
but that was one very key situation where it felt like we would've been
pushed to act.
Psy 7:We often say we don't want to section people because we're con-
cerned about the therapeutic relationship. Some of that may also be a
natural reticence to use a very restrictive practice when we're not by
nature policemen.
3.3. Likelihood of response to treatment.
There was very little discussion of the therapeutic purpose of hospi-
talization in the observed assessments, possibly reﬂecting an implicit
assumption that detention would not be considered for any other pur-
pose (a hypothesis supported by the role of diagnosis in limiting consid-
eration of hospitalization to cases of acute mental illness, discussed
above). Rather, the practitioners discussed the likely outcomes of theproposed treatment for the patient in question, weighing up the bene-
ﬁts and costs. Detention was treated as unjustiﬁable if the costs to the
patient appeared to outweigh the likely beneﬁts:
Psy 1:Wouldwe bring her into hospital to treat her illness [schizo-affec-
tive disorder] or would we be just bringing her in as a short term mea-
sure to deal with an ongoing problem,which is her vulnerability and the
difﬁculties she has with coping given her limitations… I quite acknowl-
edge those are concerns, but I don't think those are concerns that we're
going to sufﬁciently mediate by bringing her in right now.
Psy 2: It's not gonna necessarily help her engage with mental health
services in the future if we admit her to a psychiatric ward that's likely
to be a fairly rough and ready experience. So there are costs to consider
to admitting her as well.
The interview data provide further insights into the intuitions of
practitioners regarding the role of the notion of treatability in the
justiﬁcation of detention. Detention was frequently characterised as
justiﬁable in cases where the patient responded well to treatment:
AMHP 5: He [man detained for treatment for schizophrenia] went
down to a place [hospital] in London and actually did really well.
On the other hand, detention was characterised as difﬁcult to justify
when no improvement was anticipated:
Psy 14: It wasmore andmore clear for me that if we detain her [a teen-
ager with conduct disorder], it's a very big label on her and it's not at
all needed. She does have long-standing issues, but those are all issues
that are not something that can be changed, actually, by bringing her
into the hospital.
3.4. Risk assessment.
During the observational component of the study, participants were
heard discussing three kinds of risk arising from the patient's condition.
First, the risks that patients posed to their own safety:
GP 3: So the choices are really do you take the risk of her running off,
absconding one more time, possibly killing herself, taking an overdose,
doing something risky, or do you say well look, enough's enough.
Second, the risks others posed to patients, especially young women
patients, all three of whom were deemed to be at risk of ‘exploitation’:
Psy 3: The fact that she was intending to go to university in the state that
she is now clearly rendered her not only a danger potentially to other
people, in terms of her erratic behaviour, but certainly to herself and
being vulnerable to exploitation and that wasn't acceptable risk for her.
Third, the risks that the patient posed to others, especially any
children living in the household:
Psy 2: She's sleeping very poorly, she's up in the night, she was up at
three o'clock in the morning and in with her children. Ah, we just
don't know what is … what form her behaviour's going to take.
Risk assessment also addressed wider notions of ‘best interests’. In
two cases, for example, the beneﬁt for the patient of having social and
family relationships protected from the deleterious effects of mental ill-
ness was discussed:
Psy 3: It was in her best interests according to the legal criteria for her to
come in, but was also in her best long-term interests for any deteriora-
tion or ﬂare-up not to reach the stage where the option to return [to the
family home] would have been precluded.
This type of discussion could function as a means of acknowledging
the views of relatives, which other studies (see, e.g., Kullgren et al.,
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whilst preserving the principle that the decision to detain should be
based upon the interests of the patient.
3.5. Decision-making capacity.
The absence of decision-making capacity is not one of the legal
criteria for detention under Sections 2 or 3 of theMHA. However, during
the observational component of the study, the patient's capacity to
make decisions about treatment was discussed during all of the cases
that resulted in hospitalisation,whether or not the patientwas detained
under the Mental Health Act. In all of the cases where a recommenda-
tion for detention was made, the patient was characterised as unable
to understand the nature of their illness and/or the need for treatment.
In the only observed case where all the practitioners agreed that infor-
mal admission would be appropriate, the patient was characterised as
capable of making the decision to accept treatment:
Psy5 [addressing his colleagues as they agree to organise a voluntary
admission]: I think basically he seemed to be willing to come into hos-
pital informally and it seemed that he understood the reasons for the
admission. He seemed to be having capacity to make that decision.
It is striking that the ﬁnding of capacity occurred in the case of a pa-
tientwho readily agreed hospital to admission. In all the other cases, the
patient had refused hospital admission or asked to be discharged. Med-
ical recommendations for detention were made after patients were
characterised as failing to understand the reasons why hospitalisation
was being recommended. However, therewas no evidence of formal as-
sessment of decision-making capacity. Instead, the absence of capacity
appeared to be inferred from failure to agree wholeheartedly to admis-
sion or treatment:
Psy4 [making the case for detention under the MHA]: And you know,
there's something almost cognitively lacking in her, in that she'll have,
we'll have a long discussion and at the end of it, the ward round, she'll
say ‘Can I go home then?’
This observation raises the possibility that, in practice, incapac-
ity is treated as a necessary condition for justiﬁable detention,
although capacity may be determined on the basis of outcome
(i.e., treatment refusals are treated as evidence of incapacity and
acceptance of treatment is treated as evidence of capacity) rather
than functional ability. This hypothesis is supported by the way
that incapacity was deﬁned in the interview data. Most partici-
pants characterised treatment refusal as arising from a ‘lack of in-
sight’ and it was this, rather than incapacity as deﬁned in the
Mental Capacity Act that, in their opinion, justiﬁed detention for
compulsory treatment in their eyes:
Psy6: I guess one of the striking things when you move from having
spent nearly ﬁve years in general medicine into psychiatry, is this idea
that not everyone wants to see you, as a patient, and that there is the
need for the Mental Health Act … I mean she, in a sense, couldn't see
that she was unwell, and therefore why should she accept treatment?
Psy17: She, of course, had absolutely no insight into the fact that she
might have a mental illness. She wouldn't see anyone from mental
health services.
3.6. ‘Difﬁcult’ and ‘straightforward’ decisions.
During the interview component of the study, ten participants
recounted cases which they described as straightforward decisions.
One feature common to the majority of ‘straightforward’ decisions to
discharge patients, or not admit them to hospital in the ﬁrst place,
was behaviour that was characterised as an understandable responseto a particular social context or environmental trigger rather than a con-
sequence of mental ill-health:
Psy17: So, for example, people have fallen out with their spouses or
partners and they've taken an impulsive overdose or made a threaten-
ing statement, they have been picked up by the police and when they've
spent a couple of hours in the 136 suite or talking to professionals, they
calm down and they realise that perhaps yes, things are not going well
in the relationship and they're ready to take advice and ask for help. So
that's again fairly straightforward, there's not much controversy as to
what you do with those things.
The other common feature in this group of straightforward cases
was the emergence of evidence, suggesting that the risk of harm to
the patient or others was not as high as it ﬁrst appeared:
Psy1: I did a general psychiatric assessment, which was just take her
history, ﬁnd out what actually happened, um, explore motives and
suicidality, and it transpired that there wasn't very much there at all.
She had taken an impulsive overdose. She was not suicidal in mood,
she was well supported, she wasn't really depressed, it had all been in
response to social stress and she was waiting for her parents to pick
her up.
Features common to the majority of ‘straightforward’ decisions to
detain were as follows: (1) an uncontested diagnosis of psychosis or se-
vere mood disorder, (2) a high probability of improvement if treated,
(3) impaired decision-making capacity resulting from difﬁculty under-
standing the need for treatment (as perceived by the clinicians), (4) a
high risk of harm to the patient or others, and (5) the presence of
signiﬁcant distress or disability:
Psy10: He just became very, very psychotic … he thought that he'd
cracked some very powerful sort of code and only he knew it. And
then he felt that therewere thesewomenwhowere interfering… he ac-
tually attacked a girl because of that belief. Not because of anything else,
it was because she was interfering with that process that only he was
engaged in. And, all of his, like, processes, if you like … to me, he did
not have the capacity to make, I think, even small decisions, let alone
for his treatment or anything... This was a very unwell man, requires
treatment, doesn't have the capacity, and you step in on those grounds.
Psy4: But her depression was very convincing, very severe and she was
quite disabled by it…And shewas probably themost ambivalent lady I′
ve ever seen. She would really request an admission, then no sooner had
she got to the ward but she would request discharge. And this happened
three or four times, and she often would go home and have a relapse
and overdose … And I realised that she wasn't in a position, a frame
of mind, to make a choice … longitudinally, it became very clear to
me that this lady needed to be on section, that she wasn't able to really
make these big decisions, and when she made them her suicidality and
her depression really sort of confounded the picture and made her
change her mind. It was straightforward in that it was very clear to
me and her GP, because we had been struggling.
Cases that appeared to cause particular difﬁculty included those in
which one ormore of the features of straightforward caseswere not un-
equivocally present.
Six participants described ‘difﬁcult cases’ where the current degree
of mental illness was difﬁcult to assess or the net beneﬁts of admission
were difﬁcult to predict. This difﬁcultywas also evident in one of the ob-
served cases. After the assessment of a young woman with a relapsing
and remitting psychotic illness, whowas also signiﬁcantly intellectually
Table 1
Legal and practical criteria for compulsory admission and treatment.
Section 3 MHA legal criteria Practical criteria
The person must have a ‘disorder or
disability of the mind’ which may
encompass conditions such as mental
illness, personality disorder or, in the
context of ‘abnormally aggressive or
seriously irresponsible conduct’,
intellectual disability.
The person must have a serious mental
illness such as a severe depression or an
acute psychotic episode.
The disorder must be ‘of a nature or
degree which makes it appropriate for
him to receive medical treatment in a
hospital … and it cannot be provided
unless he is detained under this section’
Compulsory admission must represent
the ‘least restrictive alternative’—it
must be the case that in-patient
treatment is necessary and the patient
cannot be persuaded to accept informal
admission.
‘appropriate medical treatment is
available’ deﬁned as: ‘nursing,
psychological intervention and
specialist mental health habilitation,
rehabilitation and care, the purpose of
which is to alleviate, or prevent a
worsening of, the disorder or one or
more of its symptoms or manifestations’
In-patient treatment must be likely to
bring about an improvement in the
patient's condition, and this beneﬁt
must not be outweighed by any risks or
disadvantages associated with the
treatment plan.
‘It is necessary for the health or safety of
the patient or for the protection of other
persons that he should receive such
treatment’
The treatment is in the best interests of
the patient, or is necessary to protect
others.
Treatment is judged to be in the
patient's best interests if it protects the
patient from harm or exploitation,
improves the patient's mental health, or
protects the patient's wider interests.
The patient lacks insight into the
diagnosis of mental illness or the need
for assessment or treatment.
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difﬁcult because:
AMHP1: You have to be convinced that she is so ill she needs to be in
hospital in terms of her mental illness. People have seen her before
me; they knewwhat she's like when she's really ill; this was my ﬁrst ac-
quaintance with her.
Five participants described ‘difﬁcult cases’ where the two statutory
frameworks (the Mental Health Act and the Mental Capacity Act) both
appeared applicable, and a decision about which framework to apply
was required. This difﬁculty was also evident in one of the observed
discussions:
Psy2 [addressing Psy1]: I, er, yep. I, I′d conﬁrm you were thinking that
she should come into hospital but you're thinking that [AMHP1] might
not want to proceed with the application on the grounds that she's
consenting to an informal admission?
Psy1: Or that she's, yeah, that she's consenting to an informal admission
or that she is not actively opposing if there is a doubt about capacity.
That's the only thing, I′m just wondering about that point you raised
earlier.
AMHP1: Yes. But this is the point about Mental Capacity Act, if
somebody's going along with it. But then I′m, I myself think that she's,
was okay with us, but did say she was not a mental patient earlier on
so I′m concerned about…
Psy2: Andwe asked her point blankwhether shewould consider coming
into hospital and to be honest she was, I felt at that point her answer
was almost unintelligible.
AMHP1: She's not understanding at all. No.
Psy2: Due to her thought disorder, due to her illness. And I, in this cir-
cumstance, I think this is clearly a circumstance where the Mental
Health Act…
AMHP1: Takes precedent.
Finally, six participants described ‘difﬁcult cases’ involving high risks
of physical harm. It appears that one complex element of decision-
making concerns ideas of responsibility and accountability and their re-
lationship to the level of risk posed by the patient. Practitioners ap-
peared to view themselves as potentially being held accountable for
the behaviour of people they did not detain. In most cases, this aware-
ness caused anxiety, and some participants described using detention
in caseswhere theywere not completely convinced that it was justiﬁed,
in order to manage their anxiety:
Psy17: I think I′m being slightly controversial here, but I think the GP's
concern here was more about covering our arses for any potential
risk, rather than what was in the best interests of the patient. And I
wasmore concerned about the long-term strategy ofmanaging this per-
son, the therapeutic relationship with the team and so on. So I think we
all had slightly different takes on what would be the best thing to do in
this case. I think eventually, again I′m being a little bit controversial, I
think the GP's fears about a potential nasty incident communicated it-
self sufﬁciently to both the social worker and me, and we decided the
safest option would be for him to be in hospital.
4. Discussion
The results of this study suggest that, when making decisions about
the use of compulsory admission, practitioners employed their own
‘practical criteria’. Although the practical criteria are similar to the
legal criteria of the Mental Health Act, there are some important differ-
ences between policy, as operationalised in mental health legislation,
and practice, as enacted in real-life decisions (see Table 1).In order to analyse the ways in which practitioners justify their
decisions, it is useful to consider the underlying principles upon which
the legal and practical criteria may be based. Within moral and political
philosophy, there are two potential justiﬁcations for restricting liberty:
the harm principle, which states that it may be justiﬁable to limit
someone's liberty in order to prevent them from harming others, and
paternalism or limitation of someone's liberty for their own good.Whilst
the harm principle remains widely accepted as a justiﬁcation for the
deprivation of liberty, paternalism per se is more difﬁcult to justify in a
liberal system (Mill, 1998[1859]; Feinberg, 1984). However, a limited
form, soft paternalism, is widely (although not universally) accepted.
Soft paternalism justiﬁes limitations on liberty, for the beneﬁt of the
person being limited, provided that they are unable to make a choice
that would be consistent with their own interests. This lack of
decision-making ability may stem from a lack of knowledge about the
likely consequences of a particular choice or froman inability to exercise
appropriate judgment in making a choice. The degree of capacity re-
quired to make a choice, is, according to several inﬂuential theorists,
on a continuum that varies with the potential consequences of the
choice to be made (Feinberg, 1986; Eastman & Hope, 1988; Buchanan
& Brock, 1990;McMillan &Gillett, 2005). Thus, a greater degree of inter-
ference with liberty may be justiﬁable in situations where people are at
risk of causing themselves signiﬁcant harm.
The legal criteria for authorising deprivation of liberty under the
Mental Capacity Act (through theDeprivation of Liberty Safeguards) ap-
pear to provide authorisation on the basis of soft paternalism alone. Pa-
tients can only be hospitalized under this framework if they are unable
tomake their owndecision about the need for care and treatment, and if
that care and treatment is necessary in their best interests. The legal
criteria of the Mental Health Act authorise deprivation of liberty
through compulsory admission on the basis of either the harmprinciple,
as patients can be hospitalized if this is necessary for the protection of
others, or, alternatively, paternalism as patients can be hospitalized if
this is necessary in the interests of their own health or safety. The
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thorisation for exercising hard paternalism, as a person with a mental
disorder who is nonetheless able to make his or her own decision
about treatment can still be deprived of liberty in the interests of his
or her own health or safety. Many of the misgivings expressed about
the amended MHA's effectiveness as a safeguard against unjustiﬁable
deprivation of liberty can be characterised as concerns about its autho-
risation of hard paternalism, especially when compared with the
approach taken by the MCA.
The ﬁndings of the analysis of the data appear to form a set of oper-
ational criteria for identifying cases where the principle of soft paternal-
ism may be applied. Furthermore, the descriptions of ‘straightforward’
decisions to detain appear to be clear examples of soft paternalism.
These observations support a hypothesis that the majority of partici-
pants in this study viewed soft paternalism as being both morally per-
missible and their primary justiﬁcation for restricting the liberty of
their patients. Some practitioners seem to have ‘imported’ the concept
of ‘best interests’ from the MCA into their decision making about com-
pulsory admission under the MHA. This is a logical step to take when
following the principle of soft paternalism, provided that care is taken
to assess the degree to which the paternalism proposed is actually
‘soft’. Without a formal assessment of capacity, and in the context of
apparent assumptions that refusal of treatment amounted to absence
of insight, which in turn amounted to lack of relevant decision-making
capacity, there is a risk that the practitioners would unwittingly make
hard paternalistic decisions.
Some of the participants in this study were also prepared to restrict
their patients' liberty according to hard paternalism or the harm princi-
ple, particularly when the risk of harm to the patient or others appeared
signiﬁcant. However, they did so reluctantly, characterising these
decisions as difﬁcult, and suggesting the possibility that, compared
with soft paternalism, the harm principle and hard paternalism provide
less convincing justiﬁcations for detention for psychiatric treatment, at
least in the eyes of a group of participants in this study. Some even sug-
gested that they did not view detention in these circumstances as fully
justiﬁed, but rather action that they felt compelled to take in order to
defend themselves against liability for any harm that their patients
may cause if not admitted to hospital.
5. Strengths and weaknesses.
This study is one of very few direct observational studies into the ac-
tual practice of assessing adults for compulsory admission for psychiat-
ric treatment (see also Holstein, 1988 and Quirk et al., 2000). The
observational element of the study provided evidence of the way
decisions are actually made, not simply the ways in which practitioners
describe their decision-making processes after the event. However,
MHA assessments are ‘hard to reach’ phenomena and it was not possi-
ble to record large numbers of instances of observed decision making.
Moreover, it is possible that the presence of an observer recording the
decision-making process inﬂuenced the outcome of the MHA assess-
ments. However, rates of completion of recommendations for compul-
sory admissions at observed assessments (72%) were comparable to
the rates recorded by the healthcare provider in the 12months preced-
ing the study (75%),which suggests that the presence of an observer did
not have a signiﬁcant effect on outcome.
Interviews provided rich data about a wide range of instances of
decision making, especially in circumstances where observational
research would not be practical or appropriate. Triangulation between
the two data sources allowed a more comprehensive description of
practice than either observation or interviews alone could provide.
Whilst a range of medical practitioners were able to participate in
interviews, AMHPs, although willing to participate in the observational
element of the study, were reluctant to participate in interviews. They
cited the impact of their workloads, which is plausible given that, at
the time of the study, there were unﬁlled posts in the AMHP rota.However, the lack of interview data from AMHPs is an unfortunate
limitation.
This study provides a detailed description of the principles used for
decision making by a particular group of medical practitioners and
AMHPs. Further, wider-reaching research is needed to establish
whether these principles are widely shared amongst other practi-
tioners, in England and Wales and in other jurisdictions.
6. Conclusions
Some aspects of the observed divergence between legal and practi-
cal criteria for admission under the MHAmay act as an additional safe-
guard against arbitrary deprivation of liberty. However, other aspects of
the divergence may have the opposite effect. The tendency to recom-
mend compulsory admission when this is judged to be in the patient's
‘best interests’, rather than necessary in the interests of his or her health
or safety, and the tendency to be swayed towards the use of compulsion
in cases where there is judged to be a risk of harm to the patient or
others, even when other factors are may be equivocal, may raise the
likelihood of compulsory admission. This risk should be addressed in
training programmes for practitioners.
One key ﬁnding of this study was that some practitioners viewed
soft paternalism as the best justiﬁcation for detention and managed
their concern that the MHA authorises detention on other grounds by
incorporating an informal test of capacity into their decision making.
However, their conceptualisation of capacity as closely related to accep-
tance of treatment, may, in practice, limit the effectiveness of their test
as a safeguard against unjustiﬁable deprivation of liberty. Once deten-
tion is used to safeguard patients' wider ‘best interests’, and not simply
in the interests of their health or safety, the possibility of widespread
deprivation of liberty opens up unless a coherent and reliable test of
capacity is incorporated into the MHA.
Another key ﬁnding was that practitioners departed reluctantly
from their usual reliance on the principle of soft paternalism to autho-
rise detention when the risk of harm to the patient or others appeared
signiﬁcant. It is possible that the unease expressed by practitioners
arises from an awareness that they are stepping outside the usual role
of health and social care practitioners to exercise powers usually
reserved for the criminal justice system (in the case of enacting the
Harm Principle) or powers that are not extended to practitioners
treating physical health conditions under the Mental Capacity Act
(which does not authorise hard paternalism).
These observations suggest a potential resolution for the tension be-
tween policy and practice: replace the problematic MHA and the MCA
Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards, which are already acknowledged as
requiring reform (House of Lords Select Committee on the Mental
Capacity Act 2005, 2014), with two new frameworks, each with a
clear function based upon a single theoretical justiﬁcation for detention.
One framework would provide legal justiﬁcation for detention on
the grounds of soft paternalism. Currently, soft paternalism can be
enacted either through the MHA or the MCA DoLS. Patients detained
under MCA DoLS have access to fewer procedural safeguards than
those detained under theMHA. However, patients detained for the pur-
pose of soft paternalism under theMHA do not have the protection of a
functional test of capacity and may be subject to greater stigmatisation
due to the connotation of the MHA with public protection. Procedural
safeguards could beprovided through a relatively informal systemof as-
sessments and hearings, similar to those currently in place to ensure
that the MHA is used appropriately. With more robust safeguards, a
framework justifying detention on the basis of soft paternalism, even
in cases where the patient objects, could remain compliant with Article
5 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The second framework would provide legal justiﬁcation for deten-
tion for treatment needed to reduce the risk of serious harm to others,
arising as a result of mental ill-health, for the small number of people
who retain decision-making capacity but nonetheless choose to place
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have committed a serious crime as a result of mental ill-health but are
more appropriatelymanaged in hospital than in prison. A formal system
of judicial oversight could provide procedural safeguards, with the role
of medical practitioners reduced to providing information on diagnosis,
prognosis and risk management, to facilitate judicial decision making.
This separation of detention powers into two systems, according to
the principle which justiﬁes the use of detentionwould be intellectually
coherent, consistent with human rights instruments and, being consis-
tent with the apparent moral sentiments of practitioners, at less risk
of idiosyncratic interpretations in practice.
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